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I. INTRODUCTION
Wind has never been more valuable. In the past decade, soaring oil
prices and fears of global warming have transformed ordinary rangelands
into prime locations for wind energy projects. Winds that once blew
only tumbleweeds now drive massive commercial wind turbines, generating
electric power.
As developers scramble to lease or purchase the best sites1 for future
wind energy projects, legal uncertainties about wind rights are becoming
increasingly apparent. Among these uncertainties is the question of how
conflicting wind rights are allocated between adjacent landowners. The
“wake” of a commercial wind turbine causes turbulence and unsteady
wind flow that can reduce the productivity of other wind turbines
situated nearby.2 Downwind wake effects can extend for a distance of
1. Numerous factors, including average wind speed, wind direction frequency, air
temperature, the availability of adequate transmission facilities, permitting issues,
and ease of vehicular access can affect a property’s attractiveness for wind energy
development. See AWS SCIENTIFIC, INC., WIND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK:
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CONDUCTING A SUCCESSFUL MONITORING PROGRAM, at 3-4 to 4-1
(1997), http://www.nrel.gov/wind/pdfs/22223.pdf. Also see the Department of Energy’s
list of factors relevant to wind turbine siting: New England Wind Forum, U.S. Department of
Energy: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/
windpoweringamerica/ne_siting.asp (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Department
of Energy Siting Considerations].
2. For a technical discussion of wind turbine wake effects and references to other
resources on this topic, see Angel Jimenez et al., Large-Eddy Simulation of Spectral
Coherence in a Wind Turbine Wake, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1–3 (2008), available at
http://www.iop.org/EJ/abstract/1748-9326/3/1/015004.
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up to ten times a turbine’s rotor diameter,3 or more than a half mile.4
Thus, even wind turbines that comply with conventional zoning setbacks5
can negatively impact the productive value of downwind properties.
Consider the following scenario:6 Two wind energy developers
separately go door-to-door along a stretch of rangeland to negotiate wind
energy leases with landowners. The owner of Parcel U (see Figure A
below) leases her land to the first developer (Upwind Developer); her
downwind neighbor leases Parcel D to the second developer (Downwind
Developer). The two developers soon discover they have leased adjacent
properties, one immediately downwind of the other. Upwind Developer
obtains a permit to install a wind turbine at Site U. Downwind Developer
obtains a permit for Site D. Unfortunately, if turbines are built at both
sites, the wake from the Site U turbine will disrupt winds flowing to Site
D, rendering the Site D turbine unprofitable.
3. See Michael Klepinger, Michigan Land Use Guidelines for Siting Wind Energy
Systems, MICH. ST. U. EXTENSION BULL. WO-1053, Feb. 2007, at 8, available at http://web1.
msue.msu.edu/wind/Siting_Wind_Systems_Bulletin1.pdf. Perpendicular wind wake
disturbances can also result for distances of up to three times a turbine’s rotor diameter.
See Adrian J. Bradbrook, Australian and American Perspectives on the Protection of
Solar and Wind Access, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 229, 232 n.21 (1988) (citing R.W. BAKER
& S.N. WALKER, WAKE STUDIES AT THE GOODNOE HILLS MOD-2 SITE (1982), a report
prepared for the Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, Oregon).
4. Commercial wind turbines commonly have rotor diameters as great as one
hundred meters. See, e.g., GE Energy, 2.5 MW Wind Turbine 5, http://www.gepower.com/prod_
serv/products/wind_turbines/en/downloads/ge_25mw_brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
5. Because of risk of rotor failure or towers falling in stormy conditions, wind
turbine setbacks from residential zoned areas, dwellings, and roads are commonly used
to ensure public safety. See SCOTT LARWOOD & C.P. VAN DAM, CALIFORNIA WIND
ENERGY COLLABORATIVE, PERMITTING SETBACK REQUIREMENTS FOR WIND TURBINES
IN CALIFORNIA 12 (Cal. Energy Comm’n Publ’n CEC-500-2005-184, Nov. 2006),
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-184/CEC-500-2005-184.PDF. It
should be noted that this paper focuses on commercial scale, land-based wind energy
development, which typically takes place in rural areas. A different set of assumptions
would apply to analyses of wake interference issues in the context of offshore or urban
wind turbine siting.
6. The described scenario is not entirely fictitious. The Author’s client found
itself in this scenario while developing a wind energy project in Klickitat County,
Washington, which ultimately led to this Article. For descriptions of similar disputes
occurring in North Dakota, see generally Lauren Donovan, An Ill Wind Blows in Dickey
County, BISMARCK TRIB., June 28, 2005, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/
2005/06/29/news/topnews/top01.txt (describing conflict between competing wind
developers over wake interference issues and proposed five-rotor-diameter setback
requirement to prevent wake interference); see also Lauren Donovan, Two Energy
Projects Competing for the Wind, B ISMARCK T RIB., Feb. 23, 2008, http://www.
bismarcktribune.com/articles/2008/02/23/news/local/149494.txt (describing the dispute
in Barnes County over setbacks to prevent wind wake interference).
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FIGURE A
Parcel U (Upwind)

Parcel D (Downwind)

Wind Flow

Turbine Site U
Turbine Site D

Upwind Developer knows that, if it installs a turbine at Site U,
Downwind Developer might sue for nuisance or under some other cause
of action for the lost wind energy productivity at Site D caused by the
Site U turbine’s wake. Because the law is unsettled as to who would
prevail in such a dispute,7 Upwind Developer finds that the risk of costly
litigation is too great and elects not to install its turbine. Downwind
Developer similarly dismisses plans to install its Site D turbine, unsure
whether the law would provide any remedy if Upwind Developer were
to later install a turbine at Site U. As a result, no turbine is installed and
a valuable wind energy source goes unutilized.
This Article asks which set of legal rules would best address the
turbine wake interference problem just described. The Article assumes
that an ideal rule would promote the efficient allocation of scarce wind
resources and remain consistent with existing law. A natural analytical
tool for such a discussion is Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral
Model”—a simple framework of “property rules” and “liability rules”
introduced in 1972 that has become a prominent fixture in law and
economics literature.8

7. For a discussion of the present status of the law on wind turbine wake
interference issues, see infra text accompanying notes 22–29.
8. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). The
“cathedral” referenced in the article’s title (and in the title to this Article) is the Roeun
Cathedral, of which Claude Monet produced a series of paintings from various points of
view. Id. at 1090 n.2.
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Among the greatest contributions of the Cathedral Model was its
unveiling of the infamous “Rule Four.”9 When Calabresi and Melamed
first uncovered Rule Four, they acknowledged that the rule was rarely
used to address private disputes but argued that it could have great value
in the right context.10 Thirty-six years later, Rule Four is still largely
shunned as a tool for addressing private disputes,11 with the exception of
the famous Spur Industries case that was also published in 1972.12
Commentators have offered a myriad of explanations for Rule Four’s
unpopularity.13 However, such explanations often presume a large
number of injured parties—an assumption that does not hold true in the
wind turbine interference context. Moreover, a growing public policy
interest in promoting efficient wind turbine siting bolsters arguments in
favor of the liability rule protection that Rule Four would provide.
Indeed, the recent expansion of wind energy development may have
introduced a unique set of circumstances for which Rule Four is
appropriate: conflicts between landowners over competing wind rights.

9. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.
L. REV. 965, 1009 (2004) (calling the deduction of the possibility of Rule Four in
Calabresi and Melamed’s article “the most startling and, to nuisance commentators, one
of the most influential aspects” of their model). For those unfamiliar with Rule Four and
the other three rules or wishing to refresh their memory, see infra text accompanying
note 34.
10. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1117 (“The fourth rule is . . . not part of
the cases legal scholars read when they study nuisance law, and is therefore easily
ignored by them. But it is available, and may sometimes make more sense than any of
the three competing approaches.”).
11. In his remarks at a symposium in 1997 to commemorate the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the Cathedral Model, A. Douglas Melamed discussed how Rule Four is
frequently used in public law but conceded that the rule still was “not common in the
private litigation context.” A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective,
106 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209 (1997).
12. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972)
(enjoining a cattle feedlot operator from continuing operations but requiring neighboring
property owners to compensate the operator for the costs of relocating or terminating
operations). See infra text accompanying notes 92–96 for a more detailed description of
the Spur Industries case.
13. For a more detailed discussion of Rule Four and possible explanations for its
unpopularity, see infra text accompanying notes 88–104.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Recent Whirlwind of Wind Energy Development
Two thousand seven was an unprecedented year for wind energy
development in the United States. Developers installed 5244 megawatts
of new wind power capacity in 2007, increasing the nation’s total
capacity by forty-five percent in a single year.14 This one-year increase
was twice that of the previous record increase set in 2006.15
Numerous factors have recently coalesced to boost U.S. demand for
wind-generated power. Improved turbine technology has reduced the
cost of wind power production which, combined with the rising cost of
fossil fuels,16 has narrowed the cost gap between wind-generated
electricity and electricity produced from natural gas or coal.17 Federal
tax credits applicable to wind energy have further accelerated wind
energy development in recent years.18 Ambitious state-level renewable
energy portfolio standards could continue to fuel demand for wind
energy projects for years to come.19
Despite the U.S. wind energy industry’s remarkable growth, the
industry may still be in its embryonic stages. Wind-generated power
presently accounts for only about one percent of the U.S. electricity
supply even though one study found that U.S. wind resources are
capable of generating more than twice the total amount of electricity
14. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N., ANOTHER RECORD YEAR FOR NEW WIND
INSTALLATIONS 1 (2008), http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Market_Update.pdf.
15. See id. at 1, 3 (showing that less than 2500 megawatts of wind power capacity
were installed nationwide in 2006).
16. For data showing the recent rise in light crude oil prices, see generally TFC
Commodity Charts, Light Crude Oil, Monthly Price Chart, http://futures.tradingcharts.
com/chart/CO/M (last visited Dec. 24, 2008). Although oil prices dropped precipitously
after peaking at over $147 per barrel in July of 2008, the price volatility risk evidenced
by the 2008 spike in oil prices bolsters arguments in favor of greater reliance on wind
and other renewable energy forms whose inputs are less susceptible to market price
fluctuations.
17. See Mark Clayton, A New Gust of Wind Projects Across the US, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 19, 2006, at 2 (describing how recent advancements in turbine
technology have reduced the cost of wind power from eighty cents per kilowatt hour to
between four and five cents per kilowatt hour).
18. Title 26 of the United States Code section 45 provided production tax credits
of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour for the first ten years of operation of certain renewable
energy facilities, including wind. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2005). The credits were set to expire
on December 31, 2007, but were extended for one year by the Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 201, 120 Stat. 2922, 2844 (2006).
19. For a description of renewable energy standards and the Environmental
Protection Agency’s state-by-state summary of such standards, see Renewable Portfolio
Standards Fact Sheet, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/chp/statepolicy/ renewable_fs.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).

212

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

[VOL. 46: 207, 2009]

A Downwind View of the Cathedral
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

currently generated from all sources combined.20 A recent report released
by the United States Department of Energy describes a scenario under
which the United States could generate as much as twenty percent of its
electric power from wind by 2030.21
B. Fledgling Legal Framework
As wind energy development continues to expand, new legal questions
will inevitably arise. There is minimal case law or statutory law related
to rights in wind. Relatively unfettered by existing legislation or precedent,
policymakers charged with drafting laws in this area have significant
freedom to devise rules that will best serve social goals.
All else equal, public policy favors rules that allocate competing wind
rights so as to maximize the amount of wind energy produced over the
long run from discrete quantities of property and capital investment.22
Properties with consistent average wind speeds and other characteristics
ideal for wind energy production are a scarce and highly valuable
resource. Additionally, although wind is itself renewable, the costs of
relocating a wind turbine after initial installation can be quite substantial.23
Thus, the quality of developers’ collective decisions about where to site
wind turbines significantly affects the amount of total long-term wind
energy generation achievable from a fixed amount of investment. Rational,
profit-seeking wind energy developers already seek to maximize the
wind energy productivity of those portions of their properties that are
immune from turbine wake interference issues. However, rules are
needed to ensure efficient use of property that is situated near boundary
lines and is thus at risk of being underutilized.

20. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, TOP 20 STATES WITH WIND ENERGY RESOURCE
POTENTIAL 1 (2008), http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/Top_20_States.pdf.
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND
ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 1, 10–13 (2008), http://www1.
eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/41869.pdf.
22. Other commentators have made this sort of public policy argument. See, e.g.,
Jacob M. Davidson, Who Owns the Wind?: The Growth of the Wind Energy Industry in
Texas and the Need for Laws to Regulate It, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 101, 131 (2006)
(arguing that the state of Texas has a “genuine interest in the full development of [wind
resources] for the benefit of the Texas people”).
23. The costs of relocating even a single, relatively small turbine can easily exceed
$100,000. See, e.g., Ag Canada Shuts Down Wind Turbine, CBC NEWS, July 27, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/prince-edward-island/story/2007/07/27/agriculture-wind.html
(estimating cost of relocating small wind turbine at $120,000 in Canadian dollars).

213

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

In recent decades, commentators and governments have explored
numerous legal questions relating to wind. Rights in wind have been
compared to or contrasted with water rights,24 oil and gas rights,25 and
even rights in wild animals.26 A few states have passed legislation to address
certain discrete wind energy issues.27 Yet, there has been little discussion
about the broader policy question of which rules would most efficiently
allocate wind rights among neighboring landowners so as to maximize
the aggregate productivity of wind resources.
Clear, simple legislation for allocating competing wind rights would in
itself promote wind energy development by reducing the legal uncertainties
that presently abound.28 Until recently, wind energy developers rarely
found themselves in competition with other developers for the same
turbine sites. In most cases, a developer could identify an area for potential
wind energy development, lease the relevant property, and not have to
worry too much about other developers. However, with the recent spike
in demand for wind energy, multiple developers are increasingly
competing to develop wind energy projects in the same geographic areas

24. See, e.g., Kim R. York & Richard L. Settle, Potential Legal Facilitation or
Impediment of Wind Energy Conversion System Siting, 58 WASH. L. REV. 387, 390 n.13
(1983) (referencing water rights as one of several “plausible doctrinal bases for
recognition of a property right in windflow onto land”); see also Lisa Chavarria, Wind
Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. B.J. 832, 834–35 (2005) (citing Terry E. Hogwood,
Against the Wind, 26 OIL, GAS & ENERGY RESOURCES L. SEC. REP. 6, 6–7 (2001))
(stating that wind is “more akin to a wild animal or percolating waters which must first
be reduced to possession before they have value”). Davidson also elaborated somewhat
on the water rights analogy, arguing that “the act of turbines capturing wind as it flows
across the surface of the land seems comparable to capturing water because the owner or
lessee must capture the resource to fully own it and receive monetary value for it,” and
that “like water, wind is fugitive, and its position is relatively predictable with some
study and evaluation.” Davidson, supra note 22, at 129.
25. Hogwood, supra note 24, at 6 (arguing that wind is “not like oil and gas in
place . . . which can be reduced to possession by one or more mineral owners . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 22, at 128 (suggesting that Texas could
“analogize wind to the courts’ approach to wild animal ownership”).
27. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 500.30 (2002 & Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7017-303 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.900–105.915 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 4313-17 to 43-13-19 (Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. § 700.35 (2001 & Supp. 2007). Many of
these statutes provide for the enforceability and statutory recognition of wind easements.
28. For decades, commentators have emphasized the need for legislation relating
to wind rights. See, e.g., Bradbrook, supra note 3, at 260 (“It is unrealistic to expect the
courts to provide a judicial safeguard for solar and wind access in the absence of
legislation. . . . [T]he prevailing view appears to be that any remedy for solar and wind
access must be provided by the legislature.”); see also York & Settle, supra note 24, at
411 (“Existing common law doctrine[s] and statutes generally do not directly address
either the interests of the [wind turbine] developer or the community interests threatened
by [wind turbine] development. . . . Recent statutes and ordinances resolving similar
conflicting interests in the utilization of solar energy indicate the political feasibility of
legislative clarification of the legal uncertainty clouding [wind turbine] siting.”).
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and are vying against each other for the same wind. In this competitive
environment, an increase in wake interference conflicts is bound to follow.
Some jurisdictions have established wake setbacks prohibiting wind
turbine installations within as many as five rotor diameters of a property
line.29 Widespread adoption of such setbacks would indefinitely put a
significant amount of prime wind energy development land out of
commission. A more efficient rule would encourage or facilitate agreements
among neighboring landowners to promote development of the most
productive turbine sites, regardless of proximity to property lines. Of
course, any rule chosen based on these policy objectives would still need
to stay within the constraints of existing law.
III. EVALUATING RULES FOR WIND RIGHTS ALLOCATION:
THE CATHEDRAL MODEL
A. The Model
A useful framework for analyzing resource allocation rules is the
“Cathedral Model,” introduced by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed in 1972.30 Applying the Cathedral Model to develop such
rules involves deciding (i) which party is entitled to the scarce resource
at issue and (ii) whether to protect the entitlement by a property rule or a
liability rule.31 An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the
extent that other parties wishing to acquire the entitlement from its

29. On January 11, 2008, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission issued an
order establishing “wind access buffer” setbacks of five rotor diameters in the
predominant wind axis and three rotor diameters on the secondary wind axis for projects
having a total nameplate capacity of less than 25,000 watts. Order Establishing General
Wind Permit Standards, Docket No. E,G-999/M-07-1102, 7–8 (Minn. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.windaction.org/documents/14797. See
also LARWOOD & VAN DAM, supra note 5, at 12 (describing safety-based setbacks of up
to four rotor diameters, in some cases partially or totally waivable with agreements from
adjacent property owners).
30. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. Although critiques of the
Cathedral Model have been published over the years—see, e.g., James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 440–41 (1995)—the Model remains a prominent part of law and
economics scholarship.
31. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1092. It should be noted that the
Cathedral Model also discusses “inalienable entitlements,” a third set of entitlements for
which the sale of the entitlement is heavily regulated or forbidden altogether—for
example, entitlement to one’s internal organs. Id. at 1092. A discussion of these other
entitlements has been omitted as it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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holder can do so only by purchasing it in a voluntary transaction at a
price acceptable to the seller.32 An entitlement is protected by a liability
rule to the extent that a party other than the entitlement holder has a right
to acquire the entitlement by paying some objective, non-negotiated
amount—typically determined by a judicial or legislative body.33
The Cathedral Model is often summarized in a simple two-by-two
table with the (i) entitled party on one axis and the (ii) protective rule on
the other. When applied in the context of environmental pollution—the
most common example—the Model asks whether a “polluter” should be
entitled to pollute or whether landowners downwind or downstream of
the polluter (victims) should be entitled to pollution-free water or air. In
either case, the “entitled” party’s right can be protected by either of the
two protective rules. Four different rules are possible, each numbered as
follows:34
RULE ONE: The victims are entitled to be free from pollution and
their entitlement is protected by a property rule (an injunction
against the polluter);
RULE TWO: The victims are entitled to be free from pollution
and their entitlement is protected by a liability rule (the victims
can force the polluter to pay them compensatory damages);
RULE THREE: The polluter is entitled to pollute and its
entitlement is protected by a property rule (the victims have no
legal or equitable right to stop the pollution); and
RULE FOUR: The polluter is entitled to pollute and its
entitlement is protected by a liability rule (the victims can
purchase an injunction to stop the pollution by paying the
polluter’s costs of stopping the pollution).
The turbine wake interference problem described earlier fits neatly
within the Cathedral Model. An upwind landowner whose wind turbine’s
wake effects cause—or would cause—economic injury to a downwind
neighbor is analogous to a polluter. The downwind landowner, whose
turbine is—or would be—adversely affected by the wake of the upwind
turbine, is the victim. Setting aside arguments about reciprocal or symmetric
causality,35 this upwind polluter and downwind victim paradigm is
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1115–18. In recent years, other possible “rules” under the Cathedral
Model have been proposed. For a discussion of some of these additional rules, see infra
text accompanying notes 106–09.
35. Ronald Coase challenged the polluter-victim paradigm in favor of a more
objective “symmetric” or “reciprocal” causality approach in which the polluter can be
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intuitive because downwind turbines are nearly incapable of imposing
damaging wake effects on upwind property. Figure B is a table describing
the four possible Cathedral Model rules in the turbine wake interference
context.36
FIGURE B
Property Rule

Liability Rule

Entitlement
to
Downwind
Landowner
(D)

Rule One: D may enjoin
U from installing any
turbine on U’s property
that creates wake effects
reducing the
productivity of D’s
turbines.

Rule Two: D is entitled to
damages from U for the
reduced productivity of
D’s turbine caused by the
wake of U’s upwind
turbine.

Entitlement
to
Upwind
Landowner
(U)

Rule Three: D has no
claim against U for an
injunction or for
damages.

Rule Four: D is entitled to
purchase an injunction or
easement preventing
installation of turbines on
U’s property that could
interfere with D’s turbines.

viewed as the injured party rather than the party inflicting the injury. However, at least
one commentator has noted that such an approach often has limited practical value. See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 9, at 1012–13 (“Despite Coase’s best efforts to portray the
nuisance cases as reciprocal in more than just theory, . . . the . . . cases turn out, on closer
examination, to be very asymmetric.”). Regardless, the Cathedral Model necessarily
proceeds on the assumption that one party causes the harm. For a more detailed
discussion of how a reciprocal view of causation impacts Cathedral Model analysis, see
generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1421–23
(2007) (describing how an analytical approach that distinguishes inputs to pollution from
outcomes of pollution and recognizes torts as divisible into two parts—risk and harm—
affects analysis under the Cathedral Model).
36. The table in Figure B and portions of the succeeding analysis purposefully
refers to landowners rather than developers because the discussion relates to allocation
of legal rights in wind based on fee ownership. Of course, wind energy developers who
obtain lease or easement rights in a landowner’s property can acquire no more of a right
than such landowner holds under prevailing law.
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The Coase Theorem suggests that, if transaction costs are sufficiently
low, any of the four rules would result in an efficient outcome because
competing wind rights would be assigned to either one of the two parties
and protected by some legal rule.37 However, current law fails to clearly
assign competing wind rights to any party. Even if competing wind
rights were assigned, the potential transaction costs of negotiations between
neighbors might be too great to rely solely on Coasean bargaining to
produce efficient turbine siting. Strategic behavior, endowment effects,
asymmetric information, or other factors could potentially undermine
adjacent landowners’ ability to consistently negotiate arrangements that
allocate scarce wind resources to their highest valued user.38
So which of the four Cathedral Model rules would most fairly and
effectively promote the efficient allocation of competing rights in wind?39
Commentators have considered countless factors affecting which of the
four Cathedral Model rules is appropriate in which context such that
reasonable individuals could argue in favor of any of the four rules.
However, as described below, the weight of existing scholarship seems
to favor using Rule Four for wind wake interference conflicts.
B. Choosing the Entitlement Holder
The first step in applying the Cathedral Model is deciding which party
should hold the “entitlement.” Before considering whether upwind or
downwind owners should have an entitlement in wind, we should first

37. See generally Smith, supra note 9. The Coase Theorem is based on the
premise that parties will always negotiate the transfer of an entitlement to its highest
valued user if transaction costs are sufficiently low. To briefly illustrate, suppose that
Dan values an entitlement more than Carl. If Carl receives the entitlement from the
state, then Dan will acquire it from Carl in an arms-length transaction for a price
somewhere between Carl’s valuation of it and Dan’s valuation. If, instead, Dan receives
the entitlement from the state, no transfer is negotiated between them because Dan
values the entitlement more than Carl. In both cases, the entitlement ends up with Dan,
its highest valued user. See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 732 (1996) (arguing that
if transaction costs are sufficiently low, the choice between liability rules and property
rules is not material because rational parties will bargain to reach an efficient outcome
regardless of which rule is selected).
38. A voluminous amount of scholarship is available on behavioral law and
economics. For a useful starting point to researching the endowment effect, strategic
behavior, and other behavioral law and economics concepts, see Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
39. It should be noted that there are other conceivable rules for allocating scarce
wind rights beyond the four Cathedral Model rules. These include, among others, a
“first-in-time” rule and a rule by which a court or legislative body would manually
allocate Wind Rights to the highest valued user. For a brief analysis of these two
alternative rules, see infra text accompanying notes 67–73.
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clarify both what constitutes an entitlement in wind and what it means to
be a “downwind” or “upwind” landowner.
1. “Entitlement” in Wind?
Because natural wind is both ephemeral and location specific, any
discussion of who should be entitled to wind invokes a more basic
question: Exactly what is an entitlement in wind? Is it vested ownership
in the wind itself? If so, what does it mean to “own” wind? In the
words of one commentator:
[T]he ownership of wind is a misnomer. Wind, in and of itself, does not appear
to be susceptible of any ownership. It is not like oil and gas in place . . . which
can be reduced to possession by one or more mineral owners . . . . Wind itself is
more akin to a wild animal or percolating waters which must first be reduced to
possession before they have value. To reduce wind to “possession” appears to
require that it be focused on driving the fins of a [wind turbine] which turn a
generator and ultimately generates electricity. Then and only then can wind (a)
be reduced to possession and (b) have value.40

This paper necessarily assumes that private landowners can and do
hold some sort of interest relating to the wind that passes over their
property, whether such right is characterized as (i) an ownership right in
wind itself or (ii) a right to capture wind and convert it to electric
energy. Such rights are collectively referred to herein as “Wind Rights.”
2. “Upwind” Versus “Downwind”
Although the ensuing analysis distinguishes between upwind and
downwind landowners, it is worth acknowledging that every landowner
is upwind of some neighbors and downwind of others. Landowners
have undisputed, exclusive Wind Rights as to all portions of their
property that are far enough away from boundary lines to be both (i)
immune from the wake effects of neighbors’ turbines and (ii) incapable
of reducing the productive value of wind flowing onto neighboring
properties through installation of wind turbines. Rules to allocate
competing Wind Rights between upwind and downwind landowners
relate only those portions of a parcel that could affect or be affected by a
wind turbine on a neighboring property.

40.

Hogwood, supra note 24, at 6–7.
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The diagrams in Figure C and Figure D below illustrate this point.
Each diagram assumes (i) a (conservative) five-rotor-diameter wake
interference rule;41 (ii) that prevailing winds blow from west to east; and
(iii) that there are no interference effects involving properties to the
north or south.
Figure C shows those portions of Parcels U and D that would be
available for wind energy development by their respective owners if
competing Wind Rights were given to upwind owners. Allocating
competing Wind Rights to upwind owners would allow landowners to
install wind turbines anywhere on their property—in compliance with
applicable setbacks—without liability for any wake effects impacting
their downwind neighbors. However, such a rule would discourage
landowners from installing wind turbines on the upwind-most portions
of their property, cross-hatched in Figure C, without obtaining a
privately-negotiated wind flow easement or equivalent agreement
protecting against future wind interference from their upwind neighbors.
FIGURE C
Entitlement to Upwind Owners
Parcel U

Parcel D

Wind Flow
Usable for
wind energy

Not Usable
(5 rotor
diameters)

Usable for
wind energy

Not Usable
(5 rotor
diameters)

41. This five-rotor-diameter assumption is for convenience and illustration
purposes only. As previously mentioned, it is possible for wake effects to extend for at
least ten rotor diameters. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Depending on the
turbine type and various other factors, a turbine’s adverse wake effects might in many
cases still be commercially damaging for distances exceeding five rotor diameters.

220

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

[VOL. 46: 207, 2009]

A Downwind View of the Cathedral
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Figure D shows those portions of Parcels U and D that would be
available to landowners for wind energy development if Wind Rights
were allocated to downwind owners. Giving competing Wind Rights to
downwind owners would discourage landowners from installing any
wind turbine close enough to property lines that the turbine’s wake could
cross the line and reduce the productive value of property downwind.42
A privately-negotiated easement or equivalent document from downwind
neighbors would be needed to avoid liability for turbines installed in the
cross-hatched areas of Figure D.
FIGURE D
Entitlement to Downwind Owners
Parcel U

Parcel D

Wind Flow

Usable for
wind energy

Not Usable
(5 rotor
diameters)

Not Usable
(5 rotor
diameters)

In summary, every downwind owner vis-à-vis neighbors to the west is
also an upwind owner vis-à-vis neighbors to the east. Thus, the question
of whether to allocate competing Wind Rights to upwind or downwind
owners is essentially a question of whether landowners should be entitled to
exercise Wind Rights on their property regardless of possible downwind
42. Wake setbacks established in some jurisdictions already provide for a rights
allocation comparable to that in Figure D. See, e.g., supra note 29.
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wake effects. Are landowners entitled to install wind turbines on their
property, regardless of whether the wakes of such turbines reduce the
productive value of downwind property—an entitlement to upwind
owners? Or, are landowners entitled to a natural flow of wind across
their property, unaltered by upwind neighbors’ activities—an entitlement to
downwind owners?
3. The Ad Coelum Rule
A few commentators have proposed that the “united fee ownership
rule” or “ad coelum” rule at common law might give landowners the
right to capture and make productive use of wind that blows across their
land.43 The legal maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos means “[t]o whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the
sky and to the depths.”44 Under the ad coelum rule, an owner of land in
fee possesses rights to use as much of the space above that land as can
be put to productive use.45 Such use rights arguably extend to the
installation of commercial wind turbines—an argument that supports
allocating Wind Rights to upwind owners.
However, the ad coelum rule can also be interpreted to favor downwind
owners. Nuisance law recognizes landowners’ rights or privileges to
keep their air space—as defined under the same ad coelum rule—free
from certain undesirable substances and effects.46 The question thus
becomes which landowner’s ad coelum right is superior, and this puts
the analysis right back where it began. Indeed, the ad coelum rule alone
is inadequate for resolving situations where a landowner’s productive
use of its air space necessarily devalues the air space of a neighbor.

43. See, e.g., Joseph O. Wilson, The Answer, My Friends, Is in the Wind Rights
Contract Act: Proposed Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1775, 1784 (2004) (describing the united fee ownership rule and arguing that “[t]he
natural extension” of the rule “dictates a legal right to ‘harvest’ the wind that blows
across one’s land . . . .”). See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946)
(stating that a “landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land”), cited in York & Settle, supra note 24, at
391.
44. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1968).
45. The right to utilize the space above one’s property to exceeding heights is
supported at common law. See, e.g., People v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 287 N.E.2d 677,
679 (1972) (holding that construction of a 110-story building not be enjoined even
though it would interfere with television reception in nearby areas because a landowner
has the right to construct a building on its property at any desired height, subject to any
applicable land use regulations), cited in Rita F. Taubenfeld & Howard J. Taubenfeld,
Wind Energy: Legal Issues and Legal Barriers, 31 SW. L.J. 1053, 1075 (1977).
46. For a discussion of the ad coelum rule as applied to nuisance law, see generally
Smith, supra note 9.
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Ronald Coase observed that a court’s or legislature’s determination as
to which party’s ad coelum right trumps the other’s is often normative,
with the largest factor being which party’s use is more socially
valuable.47 In wind turbine interference disputes, both parties generally
want to use a competing wind resource in the same way—to produce
electricity for commercial sale—so detailed wind studies on both sides
of the property line would be needed to determine which landowner’s
turbine sites have the greatest productive potential. Preferably, such
factual determinations would be done privately by the parties in
connection with arm’s length negotiations rather than by a county’s
zoning board or the judicial system.48 The “invisible hand” of private
transactions can work to allocate Wind Rights only after the legal system
has granted an entitlement to those rights to one of the competing
parties. Hence, there is a need for a bright line rule that allocates
competing Wind Rights to either upwind or downwind owners.
4. Analogies to Other Property-Specific Resources
Existing laws allocating analogous natural resources seem to favor
giving competing Wind Rights to upwind owners. Unlike in the
pollution context, a turbine wake interference dispute asks which of two
parties should be entitled to harness a scarce, location-specific resource.
Existing laws for allocating mineral rights, oil and gas rights, hunting
rights and other property-specific interests are often tailored to create an
“exclusion regime” that can ease enforcement and minimize disputes.49
In each case, the rights are most commonly allocated along property
boundary lines. A holder of a fee simple estate is typically entitled to
extract minerals, drill for oil, and hunt for wild game only within the
boundaries of its own property. A landowner who captures a wild animal
just before it exits her property owes nothing to her neighbor.

47. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960),
cited in Smith, supra note 9, at 1013–14.
48. This “highest valued user” rule is discussed infra, text accompanying notes
72–73.
49. See Smith, supra note 9, at 972–74 (describing the use of property rules to
create an “exclusion regime” giving owners a “gatekeeper right” as to the property being
protected).
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In some ways, interests in subsurface oil and gas provide a useful
analogy for Wind Rights.50 Like wind, oil and gas are often mobile such
that one landowner’s capture of them might reduce the amount available
for capture by a neighbor. Oil and gas laws in several states provide that
landowners have the exclusive right to drill and capture oil and gas
directly beneath the surface of their land, up to the property line on all
sides.51 A rule giving competing Wind Rights to upwind landowners
would allow landowners to capture wind energy in all air space up to
their property line and would thus mirror such oil and gas laws, fitting
comfortably within existing law.52
5. Contra Costa and the “Wind Estate”
Giving competing Wind Rights to upwind owners would also facilitate
clearer, simpler Wind Rights transfers—for example, by reservation or
as a separate estate—because a landowner’s Wind Rights would involve
no more nor less than the land and air space within the landowner’s
property boundary lines. A California appellate court has held that the
right to capture wind and convert it to energy can be severed from a
surface estate—a clear step in the direction of giving upwind owners
competing Wind Rights.53 The court in Contra Costa Water District v.
Vaquero Farms, Inc., was asked to consider whether a municipal water
district could sever a property’s Wind Rights from the fee estate and
reserve such rights to a private landowner in a condemnation proceeding.54
The court cited the landowner’s thirty-year wind energy lease as
“irrefutable evidence that one may have a right to use windpower rights
without owning any interest in the land,” concluding that “windpower
rights are ‘substantial rights’ capable of being bought and sold in the
marketplace.”55 Rejecting the argument that fee ownership was inexplicably
connected to Wind Rights, the court embraced the water district’s argument
that “[t]he right to generate electricity from windmills harnessing the
wind, and the right to sell the power so generated, is no different, either

50. The analogy to oil and gas can only go so far before encountering material
differences with Wind Rights. See infra text accompanying notes 80–83.
51. See Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1
ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 281, 301 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Wind Energy]
(referencing oil and gas laws in Oklahoma, Louisiana, California, and other states).
52. Multiple articles on Wind Rights have reached this same conclusion. In one
commentator’s view, the “right to reduce wind to possession is an incident of surface
ownership.” Davidson, supra note 22, at 106, citing Hogwood, supra note 24.
53. See Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 4th 883
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 893.
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in law or common sense, from the right to pump and sell subsurface oil,
or subsurface natural gas by means of wells and pumps” and that Wind
Rights could thus similarly be severed from a surface estate.56
Statutory adoption of Contra Costa, with an assumption that fee
owners inherently hold Wind Rights up to the boundary lines of their
property, would reduce legal uncertainty surrounding the conveyance or
reservation of a Wind Rights “estate” separate from a fee simple estate.57
In contrast, if Wind Rights were allocated to downwind owners, a fee
owner’s Wind Rights estate would necessarily be subject to a downwind
owners’ right to prohibit damaging wind turbine wakes from crossing
the property line.
6. An Entitlement in Upwind Owners Minimizes Litigation
A rule giving competing Wind Rights to upwind owners would likely
generate less litigation than a rule in favor of owners downwind. The
wind flowing into a wind turbine obviously cannot be distorted by other
turbines situated downwind. Thus, under a rule allocating Wind Rights
to upwind owners, no interested party would both (i) hold an entitlement
and (ii) be capable of having that entitlement infringed upon in a legally
cognizable way. If a liability rule were ultimately chosen to protect
competing Wind Rights, information cost factors that become relevant
when government decisionmakers valuate entitlements under liability
rules would also favor giving upwind owners the Wind Rights entitlement.58
For all of the reasons just described, the preferable approach is to give
competing Wind Rights to upwind owners. Property owners should be
free to install wind turbines anywhere on their property—within conventional
setbacks—regardless of whether a turbine’s wake might disrupt the wind
flowing onto properties downwind.

56. Id. at 894.
57. Davidson, supra note 22, at 131 (advocating Texas’s adoption of the Contra
Costa ruling on the theory that “wind estate owners, using the court’s reasoning in
Contra Costa, would enjoy the same rights as mineral estate owners including the right
to develop and the right to lease”).
58. Because of difficulties in measuring wake effects, it is easier for decisionmakers to
estimate an upwind owner’s loss from having to relocate a turbine site than to estimate a
downwind owner’s economic loss from an upwind turbine’s wake. See infra text
accompanying notes 98–102.
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7. Entitlement to Upwind Owners: Dismissing Rules One and Two
A decision to give competing Wind Rights to upwind owners effectively
eliminates two of the four possible rules in the Cathedral Model’s
conventional two-by-two diagram (Figure B above). Rules One and Two
each would have allocated conflicting Wind Rights to downwind property
owners, presumably on a theory that landowners are entitled to undisturbed
wind flow across their property. Dismissing Rules One and Two not
only seems desirable from a theoretical perspective but is consistent with
prevailing law.
a. Rule One
Rule One would have permitted a downwind landowner to obtain an
injunction against installation of upwind turbines whose wake effects
were capable of crossing the property line. Current law ordinarily reserves
such injunctions only for cases of trespass or strong nuisance.
In its most generic sense, trespass is an action for the physical
invasion of a visible object onto the property of another.59 Trespass
ordinarily does not cover cases where the physically invading object is
invisible to the naked eye.60 In the case of wind interference, only the
invisible turbulence caused by a turbine’s wake invades another’s
property so a claim for trespass in such contexts would be unsupported
under common law.
Although the wake of a wind turbine can more easily be characterized
as a private nuisance than as a trespass, a turbine wake is not the sort of
nuisance that would be expected to merit an equitable remedy. An actionable
private nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion” causing substantial
interference and significant harm.61 If a turbine’s wake causes substantial
interference to a downwind turbine and results in a significant economic
loss to the downwind owner, operating the turbine could arguably
constitute a nuisance under this conventional definition. However, an
injunction is typically available for nuisance only when damages would
inadequately compensate the injured party and a balancing of relative

59. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § P6.07[1] (Michael
Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender Supp. 2004) (1949).
60. See Smith, supra note 9, at 993–94 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass,
Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 28–29
(1985)).
61. See POWELL, supra note 59, at § 64.02[1]–[2] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821D (1979); Tenn v. 889 Associates Ltd., 500 A.2d 366 (N.H. 1985)
(finding that interference with air and light was not substantial); Hendricks v. Stalnaker,
380 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1989) (finding that digging of water well did not constitute
significant harm)).
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harms favors injunctive relief.62 Damages are likely an adequate remedy
in disputes between commercial wind energy developers over turbine
wake interference. In short, Rule One diverges too far from existing
common law principles to warrant further consideration.
b. Rule Two
A Rule Two approach seems a bit more plausible under existing law.
Rule Two would have entitled landowners to damages for decreases in
the commercial value of their property resulting from the wake effects
caused by an upwind neighbor’s turbine.63 Nuisance actions for which
damages might be an available remedy often involve nontrespassory
intrusions onto others’ property, such as noise, odor, or aesthetic blight.64
However, a nuisance claim for the damaging effect of a turbine’s
wake—located hundreds of feet in the air65—on a unique, sensitive
downwind use like wind energy development is far less likely to
succeed. Under common law, nuisance claims for damages to a plaintiff’s
sensitive, atypical use usually fail.66 In summary, it appears that little is
lost in foregoing Rules One and Two because neither rule would fit
comfortably with the existing body of law.
8. Dismissing Alternative Allocation Rules
A mere upwind versus downwind analysis under the Cathedral Model
arguably overlooks some other possible rules for allocating Wind Rights.
62. See POWELL, supra note 59, at § 64.07[1] (stating that the “usual basis for
equitable intervention” is “the inadequacy of the remedy at law”).
63. In cases under a hypothetical Rule Two where an upwind turbine is installed
prior to installation of any turbine downwind, the likely remedy would be “permanent
damages.” The upwind landowner would pay a judicially determined dollar amount to
the downwind owner, but the downwind owner and his or her successors in interest
would be permanently barred from claiming turbine wake interference damages. The
classic “permanent damages” case cited in law and economics literature is Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).
64. See Smith, supra note 9, at 992 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 622 (5th ed. 1984)).
65. The latest generation of commercial wind turbines can be up to 420 feet high.
See Donovan, Two Energy Projects Competing for the Wind, supra note 6.
66. See POWELL, supra note 59, at § 64.05[5] (“A plaintiff[] whose use of land
makes it peculiarly susceptible to harm cannot use those unique circumstances to veto
conduct by neighbors that constitutes a private nuisance only because of the plaintiff’s
particular use.” (citing Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or.
1948))).
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Two conceivable alternatives to the upwind versus downwind approach—
and the respective shortcomings of each—are discussed below.
a. “First-in-Time” Approach
Like the water law doctrine of “prior appropriation,” a rule for Wind
Rights allocation could ignore the relative upwind or downwind
locations of competing landowners. Wind Rights could instead be allocated
based on which landowner first installs a turbine making productive use
of the wind. New Mexico has a permit system for solar rights that is based
on the prior appropriation doctrine.67 Under New Mexico’s system,
“first-in-time is first-in-right” so long as the initial use of solar energy is
beneficial. Oil and gas laws in some states also involve somewhat of a
“first-in-time” rule because whichever landowner is the first to extract
subsurface oil from immediately below the landowner’s property
acquires title to the oil extracted.68
One positive aspect of a first-in-time rule is its potential to accelerate
development of wind turbine sites, thus putting wind resources to
productive use more quickly. However, this approach can also promote
rash, inefficient development, leading to suboptimal long-term use of a
scarce renewable resource. For example, some have criticized New
Mexico’s solar permit system on the ground that it can allow less
productive land uses—for example, a personal solar water heater—to
prevent development of more productive uses such as large-scale
developments.69
A first-in-time rule for Wind Rights would yield an inefficient
outcome in every case where the first developed site has less wind
energy potential than a competing neighbor’s site. To illustrate, suppose
that a turbine installed at Turbine Site D—from the wind interference
fact pattern discussed earlier70—could produce electricity capable of
generating a profit with a net present value of $200,000. Suppose further
that the same turbine would produce a profit with a net present value of
$300,000 if it were instead installed at Turbine Site U. Under a first-intime rule, if the downwind developer installed its turbine first, $100,000
worth of potential generating capacity would be lost. Given the fully
renewable character of wind and the significant expense of relocating
wind turbines once installed, the long-term consequences of a first-in67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-1–47-3-5 (LexisNexis 1978 & Supp. 2007).
68. See Smith, Wind Energy, supra note 51, at 301.
69. See Bradbrook, supra note 3, at 262–63 (citing Deborah Zamora Grout, Note,
Access to Sunlight: New Mexico’s Solar Rights Act, 10 N.M. L. REV. 169, 171–74
(1980)).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
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time rule could be substantial. A simple allocation of competing Wind
Rights to all upwind landowners would prevent races between neighbors
to install turbines solely for the purpose of securing Wind Rights, thus
increasing the likelihood of efficient voluntary bargains.71
b. “Highest Valued User” Approach
Another possible approach would be for a third-party decisionmaker—
for example, a court or a county official—to determine which of two
neighboring landowners places a higher value on a set of competing
Wind Rights and allocate the Wind Rights entitlement to that owner. As
Richard Posner might argue, it may be easier to merely determine which
of two landowners places the highest wind energy development value on
a given area of land than to quantify the actual value either party places
on the land.72 A subscriber to Posner’s perspective might advocate a
rule where the decisionmaker determines which party is the “highest
valued user” and awards competing Wind Rights to that party, protecting
the entitlement with a property rule.
The obvious downside of a highest valued user approach is its high
administrative burden. In many wind interference disputes, wind studies
are likely to have been conducted on only one side of the property line.
Under a highest valued user approach, every time a landowner filed a
permit to install a turbine within a wake-sensitive area, the landowner
and neighbor would find themselves in costly, fact-specific hearings
debating which owner’s property had greater productive value. The
necessary cost and expense of waiting for studies to be concluded on

71. For example, under a first-in-time rule, opportunistic landowners might also
install cheap, smaller turbines in an effort to secure competing Wind Rights, leading to
inefficient use of the total capital available for wind energy development.
72. See Richard R. W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property
Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267,
276, 277 (2002) (“Posner maintains that efficient property rules are easier to determine
because judges need only compare which one of two valuations is greater, as opposed to
the more difficult task of determining either valuation.”) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998)). Brooks also points out that “when judicial
errors are significant and common to both parties, property rules become relatively easier
for the judge to accurately determine . . . . When the observational noise is varied across
parties (i.e., negatively correlated or uncorrelated), then the liability rule-like task of
determining a single height is marginally easier.” Id. at 270. A more detailed
description of Posner’s valuation-cost discussion of property rules is available at
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 68–70 (7th ed. 2007).

229

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

both sides and then comparing those studies would be substantial.73
Indeed, a highest valued user approach seems capable of creating greater
obstacles to wind energy development than it would eliminate.
C. Property Rule Versus Liability Rule
Having determined that competing Wind Rights should be vested in
upwind landowners, we arrive at the second step in applying the
Cathedral Model: selecting a rule to protect the entitlement. Now that
we have eliminated the top half of our two-by-two table from Figure B,
we are left to choose between Rule Three and Rule Four. Rule Three
would protect upwind owners’ Wind Rights with a property rule. Rule
Four would protect upwind owners’ Wind Rights with a liability rule.
The choice between property rules and liability rules is the subject of
an immense body of law and economics scholarship. Shortly after the
Cathedral Model was published, many commentators seemed to embrace
the principles that property rules were preferable when transaction costs
were low, and liability rules should be used in high transaction cost
contexts—for example, where a large number of parties reduces the
likelihood of successful voluntary bargaining.74 All else being equal,
property rules were generally deemed preferable in cases where a court’s
assessment of damages was likely to be costly or inaccurate—for example,
where one or more parties likely has highly subjective valuations of the
entitlement.75 For several years, most commentators seemed to generally
accept these as very loose principles for choosing between property rules
and liability rules. About a decade ago, however, some commentators
began arguing that liability rules are almost always preferable,76 stirring
a debate in legal academia that continues today.77 More than a dozen
73. A continuous wind study of at least one year is generally recommended in
connection with siting of commercial turbines. See Department of Energy Siting
Considerations, supra note 1.
74. For a discussion of Richard Posner’s early adoption of the low-versus-high
transaction cost approach and citations to many other commentators favoring the
approach, see Krier & Schwab, supra note 30, at 452–53.
75. For a detailed discussion of the merits and weaknesses of property rules,
liability rules, and the Cathedral Model, see generally Krier & Schwab, supra note 30, at
450, 467–70. Further development of behavioral economics and other empirical
approaches are needed to understand the vast set of nuances relating to property and
liability rules and their application.
76. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033 (1995) (arguing that
liability rules are more likely than property rules to facilitate Coasean bargains because
liability rules force parties to reveal information about their valuations of the scarce
entitlement); see also infra text accompanying notes 88–90.
77. Numerous articles have challenged the notion that liability rules are always
preferable. See, e.g., Krier & Schwab, supra note 30, at 453–55; Daphna Lewinsohn-
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factors have been identified in law and economics literature as arguably
impacting the superiority of one rule over the other.78 A case-specific
analysis is thus warranted for determining which rule is preferable in the
wind wake interference context.
1. Rule Three: Protecting Upwind Owners with a Property Rule
Under Rule Three, property owners would have no recourse—neither
damages nor an injunction—against upwind neighbors who install wind
turbines that reduce the productive value of downwind air flow.79 A
voluntary bargain for a wind easement or its equivalent would be a
downwind owner’s only means of securing usable Wind Rights for
property located near a boundary line with an upwind neighbor.
At first glance, Rule Three might seem the most compelling rule for
allocating Wind Rights. To borrow from the popular first-year property
course analogy, Wind Rights can easily be viewed as a “stick” among
the “bundle of sticks” that is conveyed with any fee interest in real
property. Such property rights are most commonly protected by a property
rule.80 As already mentioned, many jurisdictions have protected oil and
gas rights using a property rule, permitting landowners to drill straight
Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical
Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX L. REV. 219, 222 (2001) (arguing that
liability rules can reduce the likelihood of successful bargaining because, among other
reasons, “experimental findings support the argument that owners exhibit a stronger
endowment effect when their entitlement is protected by a liability rule than when it is
protected by a property rule”). Lewinsohn-Zamir’s article cites several more articles
critiquing arguments in favor of liability rules. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra, at 221.
78. See Brooks, supra note 72, at 272–73 (“Commentators have based arguments
for and against property rules and liability rules on efficient allocation, investment,
bargaining, transaction costs, revealing information, concealing information, victim
behavior, injurer behavior, undercompensation, overcompensation, risk aversion, loss
aversion, endowment effects, holdouts, and unconscionability.”). It should be noted that
Brooks’s article is focused on yet another line of argument—the relative costs of
administering each of the rules.
79. Wind energy projects today are constructed in rural areas, and modern commercial
wind turbines are often more than 420 feet in height. See supra note 65.
80. Coase and others have challenged the “bundle of rights” paradigm that
predominates in property law; they argue that a property law and economics approach
focuses too much on the most efficient allocation of rights in a scarce resource rather
than on one property owner’s right to exclude another. See Smith, supra note 9, at 978
(“[W]hether we have the right to shoot over another man’s land has been thought of as
depending on who owns the airspace over the land. It would be simpler to discuss what we
should be allowed to do with a gun.” (citing R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 34 (1959))).
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down from the surface of their land and extract oil immediately below,
up to the edge of their property line, even if the subsurface oil field
involved also flows under a neighboring property.81
However, a closer look reveals that analogies to a bundle of sticks or
to oil and gas law can ignore some unique and important characteristics
of wind. Social cost differences among possible oil and gas rights
allocations are relatively low, because the effects of such allocations are
often only distributional and have little impact on the aggregate amount
or value of the resource captured and sold. In most cases, roughly the
same amount of oil ultimately reaches the marketplace regardless of
which of two neighbors extracts and sells it.
Suppose that Parcels U and D sat above an oil field containing one
million total barrels of oil, as shown in Figure E. One could conceive of
rules that allocate the rights to this oil on a pro rata basis based on the
proportion of each landowner’s surface estate situated directly above the
oil field, to whichever party extracts the oil first, on an even fifty-fifty
split, or a myriad of other ways. But, ultimately—assuming that the oil
is properly extracted—society will likely benefit from the same one
million barrels of additional oil supply regardless of which rule is
chosen. Any of the allocation rules mentioned would be—at least
roughly—Pareto efficient because a rule that increases the oil extracted
by one landowner would generally cause an equivalent decrease in the
oil extracted by others.82

81. See supra text accompanying note 51. Some jurisdictions require “unitization”
as a means of allocating landowners’ rights in subsurface oil pools. Conflicts over Wind
Rights typically involve only two parties, whereas numerous landowner parties are often
involved in allocations of common-pool oil. Thus, unlike in the common-pool oil
context, administrative and transaction costs associated with allocating wind rights through
unitization would likely exceed any benefits from that approach. For an informative
discussion of unitization of common oil pools, see generally Gary D. Libecap & James
L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002).
82. An allocation of a scarce resource is “Pareto efficient” if the only means of
making one party to the allocation better off requires making another party worse off.
See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 40 (5th ed. 1999). Pareto efficiency, a concept
routinely referenced in law and economics literature, takes its name from the famed
nineteenth-century economist Vilfredo Pareto. Id. at 40 n.4. This conclusion naturally
assumes that each landowner has the same wealth-utility function and that each is able to
obtain the same price for oil in the marketplace.
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FIGURE E
Parcel U

Parcel D

Oil Field

Pareto efficiency is much more difficult to achieve when allocating
competing Wind Rights. Property’s wind energy potential is highly
location-specific, so the effects of rules that allocate Wind Rights affect
not just distributional outcomes but also total output. It is possible that
installing an upwind turbine fifty meters further to the north than planned
might cause only a $100,000 long-term loss to Upwind Developer yet add
$200,000 in long-run productivity to a downwind turbine. In such cases,
installing the upwind turbine fifty meters to the north is required for
Pareto efficiency. Unlike oil or even water, 83 wind is intangible and
completely renewable. Efforts to capture the kinetic energy in wind
today have no bearing on how much wind will be available for such uses
tomorrow. From a Pareto efficiency perspective, disputes over competing
Wind Rights thus more closely resemble a polluter-victim scenario than
a dispute over oil rights.
As already discussed, public policy favors rules that maximize the
productivity of scarce wind resources achievable from a given amount of

83. Analogies to water rights are also flawed. Water rights typically involve more
than two parties because rivers typically pass through more than two properties, and the
specific location where an upstream landowner diverts water typically has little or no
impact on the productive use of remaining water by downwind landowners.
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capital investment.84 Arguably, the single most important factor in achieving
such maximization is turbine siting. Once a turbine is installed, it will
likely remain on its installation site for decades. Suboptimal turbine siting
necessitates more reliance on fossil fuels, nuclear energy, or potentially
more expensive renewable energy sources to meet collective energy
demands. Rules that lead to suboptimal turbine siting fail to maximize
the total electricity output from a fixed amount of wind resources and
capital and thus impose excess social costs.
Optimal turbine siting requires successful bargaining between neighboring
landowners, and Rule Three provides no “backstop” for situations where
such bargaining fails. To illustrate, let us revisit our dispute between
Downwind Developer and Upwind Developer.85 Suppose that Upwind
Developer conducts extensive wind studies, concludes that a turbine at
Site U1 (see Figure F) could generate a profit with a net present value of
$300,000, and applies for a permit to construct a wind turbine at that
site.86 Suppose further that Downwind Developer has reason to believe
that the same type of turbine, if installed on Site D1, could generate a
profit with a net present value of $400,000. However, wake effects from
a turbine installed at Site U1 would reduce Site D1’s net present value
from $400,000 to $100,000, and the expected profit from a turbine
installed at Site D2 also would not exceed $100,000. If Upwind Developer
were to install its turbine at Site U2 instead of Site U1, there would be no
damaging wake effect at Site D1 but the expected profit at Site U2 would
be only $200,000.

84. See supra text accompanying note 22.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
86. Market value is used here as a proxy for the productive value of particular
turbine sites. In practice, wind studies often assign expected “capacity factors” to
various turbine sites based on the measured consistency and average speeds of wind in
particular locations over time. See Am. Wind Energy Ass’n., Frequently Asked Questions:
How Does a Wind Turbine’s Energy Production Differ from Its Power Production?,
http://www.awea.org/faq/basicen.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2008).
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FIGURE F
Parcel U

Parcel D

Wind Flow
Site U2
Site D1
Site U1

Site D2

In a world with no transaction costs, where bargaining is perfect,
Downwind Developer and Upwind Developer would negotiate a Coasean
bargain. Downwind Developer, after receiving notice of Upwind Developer’s
turbine permit application, would approach Upwind Developer about
installing the Site U1 turbine at Site U2 instead, in return for a relocation
payment. The parties would negotiate a payment in an amount between
$100,000 and $300,000. Upwind Developer, being rational and seeking
to maximize its income, would accept the offer and install its turbine at
Site U2. The policy goal of maximizing the productive value of the
competing Wind Rights would be achieved.
Unfortunately, behavioral economists are quick to point out that
Downwind Developer and Upwind Developer may not act rationally.
Upwind Developer might behave strategically on the misperception that
there is greater value in harming its competitor than in receiving the
offered payment. Or, Downwind Developer might delay approaching
Upwind Developer to discuss an efficient arrangement for fear of stirring
up other conflicts between them. Self-serving bias could prevent the
parties from recognizing the Pareto optimal arrangement.87 Due to these

87. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 38, at 1503–04 and accompanying
text (citing a study of school district strikes in support of the argument that self-serving
bias can prevent negotiated agreements).
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or other factors, negotiations between the developers may fail, leaving
Downwind Developer unable to build on the more productive Site D1.
Under Rule Three, Downwind Developer would have no way of forcing
Upwind Developer to relocate to Site U2 after failed bargaining. Thus,
although Rule Three would be a substantial improvement from the
present legal landscape for Wind Rights, the rule cannot be relied upon
to produce consistently efficient outcomes.
2. Rule Four: Protecting Upwind Owners with a Liability Rule
With nowhere else to turn on our two-by-two Cathedral Model diagram
of possible rules, we now consider Rule Four.88 Like Rule Three, Rule
Four would give competing Wind Rights to upwind owners. But the
weaker liability rule protection provided under Rule Four would give
downwind owners an opportunity to purchase an injunction or equivalent
remedy from upwind owners prohibiting installation of any turbines
capable of damaging wake effects that cross the property line. The price
paid for the injunction would equal the upwind owner’s judicially or
legislatively determined cost of installing no turbines in the identified area.
In an influential article published in 1996, Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell set forth an argument for why liability rules might be superior,
on average, to property rules in situations where bargaining conditions
are imperfect.89 Their reasoning was simple: The Coase Theorem shows
that either a liability rule or a property rule is successful in cases where
the parties are able to successfully bargain. However, liability rules are
superior in cases when bargaining is impossible because they permit a
non-entitled party that values the entitlement more to pay compensation
and obtain it. Therefore, liability rules are superior overall in cases where
only some bargaining is expected to succeed.90 When bargaining fails,
liability rules force parties to reveal the true valuation of their
entitlement and allow a higher-valued user to purchase the entitlement,
thus promoting efficient outcomes that would otherwise never come to
pass. The liability rule protection of Rule Four would have this desirable
effect in the context of competing Wind Rights.
88. As previously mentioned, other rules beyond the four in the Cathedral Model
are possible. To review the earlier discussion of first-in-time and highest valued user
rules, see supra text accompanying notes 67–73. Commentators have also proposed
possible add-on rules to Calabresi and Melamed’s conventional four-rule model, some of
which are also addressed in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 105–07.
89. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37.
90. See id. at 724–28. Kaplow and Shavell ultimately acknowledge that risks of
systematic judicial underestimations of harm or possible increased strategic behavior
under liability rules qualify their argument in favor of such rules. See id. at 728–37. For
a discussion of the undercompensation issue, see infra text accompanying notes 98–99.
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To illustrate, let us assume the same set of facts as described in
connection with Figure F above, except that this time Rule Four applies.
If voluntary bargaining between Upwind Developer and Downwind
Developer is successful, then—just as under Rule Three91—Downwind
Developer will pay Upwind Developer a negotiated amount to relocate
to Site U2, and an efficient siting of turbines will result. If bargaining
fails, Downwind Developer can ask a court—or some other predesignated, government authorized decisionmaker—to estimate the total
loss to Upwind Developer from installing the turbine at Site U2—or
another specified wake area—instead of at Site U1. Downwind Developer
will then have the option to pay Upwind Developer that amount in return
for an injunction or equivalent remedy prohibiting installation of the
turbine at Site U1. If Upwind Developer’s relocation cost is determined
to be any amount less than $300,000, Downwind Developer will
purchase the injunction and turbines will be constructed at Sites U2 and
D1—the outcome that most efficiently allocates the competing Wind
Rights.
Rule Four has long been the outlier of the Cathedral Model’s four
rules. The one familiar application of Rule Four to a private dispute,
which is frequently referenced in law and economics literature, was in
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., an Arizona
Supreme Court case decided in 1972.92 Spur Industries, the defendant,
was a cattle feedlot operator that had operated its feedlot in the same
location for several years.93 Del Webb was a real estate developer that
sued for nuisance after its sprawling residential development project
crept increasingly closer to the feedlot over a period of years until the
feedlot’s odor began to negatively impact unit sales.94 In this classic
coming-to-the-nuisance case, the court seemed to view Spur Industries
as the “innocent” party and recognized its entitlement to operate its
feedlot.95 However, the court may have also recognized that bargaining
under a property rule would have failed because Del Webb’s loss from
the feedlot likely would not incorporate the losses of the several

91. For a general discussion of this scenario under Rule Three, see supra text
accompanying notes 85–87.
92. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
93. Id. at 704.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 708 (“Spur is required to move not because of any wrongdoing on the
part of Spur . . . .”).
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residents who had already purchased homes nearby. Regardless, the
court chose not to apply Rule Three and simply dismiss the nuisance
suit. Instead, the court employed a liability rule, ordering Spur Industries to
relocate its feedlot and requiring Del Webb to pay the cost of the
relocation.96 The rare set of facts in Spur Industries—that is, an innocent
polluter and a guilty victim—seemed to influence the court’s decision to,
unknowingly, apply Rule Four.
If upwind landowners are viewed as innocent holders of competing
Wind Rights, then the same elements that made Rule Four appropriate in
Spur Industries are present in disputes over turbine wake interference.
Just as voluntary bargaining between the Spur Industries parties would
not have incorporated the external costs and benefits of nearby residents,
bargaining between neighboring wind project developers does not
incorporate the growing public policy interest in optimal wind turbine
siting. In both contexts, there is arguably an increased need for liability
rules to provide a second chance at the social welfare-maximizing
outcome when voluntary bargaining fails.
3.

Responding to Common Criticisms of Rule Four and Liability Rules

If Rule Four is an attractive option for resolving wind interference
conflicts, why is the rule not more commonly applied to other situations? A
perception exists that number problems, information costs, and endowment
effects reduce the desirability of Rule Four. However, wind wake interference
disputes differ from typical pollution or nuisance disputes in ways that
seem to mitigate the likelihood or severity of these negative effects.
a. Number Problems
Several commentators have blamed the unpopularity of Rule Four on
the fact that the typical “innocent polluter” case involves several victims,
and strategic behavior problems—for example, free riding—would make
it difficult for the numerous victims in such cases to collectively raise
funds sufficient to pay off the polluter.97 No such number problem exists
in the wind wake interference context because such disputes almost always
involve just two parties—an upwind and downwind landowner.
96. Id.
97. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 30, at 468 (arguing that “rule four is
paradoxical in that it reintroduces the very problem it is meant to solve” because most
cases where it would arise involve several injured residents who will face strategic
bargaining problems in pooling enough funds to pay the polluter to go away); see also A.
Douglas Melamed, A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J. 2209, 2209 (1997) (stating
that “the Spur Industries case, did not have a large number problem; maybe that is why it
was able to find a use for Rule [Four]”).

238

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

[VOL. 46: 207, 2009]

A Downwind View of the Cathedral
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

b. Information Costs
A general argument against liability rules is that courts or other thirdparty decisionmakers might fail to capture parties’ subjective valuations
and thereby underestimate damages, which can result in less efficient
outcomes than under a property rule.98 However, such undercompensation
risk is diminished in cases where both parties have purely economic
interests, as in the context of a wind wake interference dispute. Such risk
is further diminished given that the “chooser” under Rule Four is the
downwind owner, who would suffer the wake interference damages and
is thus in the best position to weigh any potential loss against the cost of
buying an injunction or easement from the party upwind.99 Regardless,
some commentators have argued that even if courts were to apply
average estimates of harm from factually similar cases, the outcome
would usually be superior to property rules.100 Giving competing Wind
Rights to upwind owners means that Rule Four will never require a
highly technical judicial determination of a turbine wake’s financial
injury to downwind neighbors.101 In all cases, the only possible judicial
valuation would be for an easement or injunction against building a
turbine in a certain area—a determination that in many cases could be
aided by existing wind studies done on the upwind owner’s property.

98. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 730–31. Richard Epstein has argued
that liability rules are appropriate only in cases where the risk of undercompensation—
due to a judicial valuation that is erroneously too low and thus eliminates the possibility
of ex-post bargaining—is less than the risk of a holdout problem among the “victim”
parties. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2103–05 (1997). Epstein’s approach would seem
to favor Rule Three, but his approach arguably fails to sufficiently weigh potential
behavioral impediments to bargaining, such as strategic behavior or asymmetric
information problems. See supra text accompanying note 38.
99. Such “best chooser” analysis is commonly applied in law and economics
literature. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (favoring rules that place the liability
on the party who is “in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made”)
(emphasis omitted).
100. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 719.
101. As previously mentioned, wind wake interference studies are extremely
technical. For a sample of such literature, see Jimenez et al., supra note 2 (applying a
“large-eddy simulation model” to simulate the turbulent flow of air in the wake of a wind
turbine).
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c. Endowment Effects
A behavioral economics-based criticism of liability rules is that they
might create greater “endowment effects” than property rules and thus
impede efficient bargaining.102 An endowment effect exists if a person’s
aversion to the loss of an item causes the person to demand a
superficially high price for it when engaged in voluntary bargaining.103
In cases where private landowners develop their own wind energy
projects on long-held family property, endowment effects might be
significant. But most commercial wind energy projects are built by
developers who have leased or obtained other interests in the project
property. Because such wind energy developers are likely to view wind
as a saleable good, rather than as a personally held entitlement, risks
associated with endowment effects are greatly diminished in such
contexts.104
4. Levmore’s Rule Five and Asymmetric Valuation Costs
Several other possible Cathedral Model “rules” have been proposed in
recent years, one of which seems worthy to note in this context.105
Under Saul Levmore’s “Rule Five,”106 Upwind Developer could choose
to install its turbine at Site U2 (see Figure F above) instead of Site U1 on
the condition that Downwind Developer make a royalty payment to
Upwind Developer. The royalty amount would equal Downwind
Developer’s financial benefit derived from undisturbed wind flow at Site
D.107

102. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 77, at 250–58 (“We should expect a stronger
[endowment effect] . . . and a greater reluctance to part voluntarily with an entitlement
when a transfer can be forced upon an owner, as is the case with liability-rule
protection.”).
103. See id. at 250–51.
104. See id. at 252.
105. In fact, commentators proposed numerous additions to the classic two-by-two
Cathedral Model. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, There Have to Be Four, 64 MD. L. REV.
136, 155–56 (2005) (arguing that Rule Four actually encompasses three possible rules,
meaning that there are six rules altogether).
106. See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2169–70 (1997). As Levmore acknowledges, his
“Rule Five” is a variation of a Rule Five described by Krier and Schwab under which the
best chooser is always given the ability to determine whether to continue its activity or to
stop and receive the judicially-determined compensation. In the wind turbine interference
context, the best chooser will almost always be the downwind owner. See infra text
accompanying note 109, for a discussion of the “Double Reverse Twist” rule.
107. More specifically, the royalty amount would be calculated as Site D’s expected
profit without any interference from upwind turbines minus Site D’s expected profit with
such interference.
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Although Levmore’s Rule Five is intriguing, its tendency to impose
higher information costs makes it less attractive than Rule Four. As
already mentioned, estimating the actual financial loss to the owner of a
downwind turbine from the wake effect of an upwind turbine is
exceptionally complicated and would be very expensive. 108 To apply
Levmore’s Rule Five, a decisionmaker—for example, a court or county
official—would be required to determine the turbine productivity loss
from such wake effect when calculating the amount of the royalty payment.
In contrast, a decisionmaker applying Rule Four would only need to
calculate the cost of siting the upwind turbine in a different location—a
calculation that is simpler and may often be further simplified by an
upwind owner’s existing wind study reports. Given that valuation costs
are clearly asymmetric between losses to upwind and downwind owners,
a liability rule is more likely to generate efficient outcomes if structured
to require only the lower-cost (upwind owner) valuation.
But what about cases where Downwind Developer has already
conducted wind studies on its property and Upwind Developer has not?
In such cases, the court may have ample information about the potential
loss to Downwind Developer if Downwind Developer is not able to
install its turbine, but the court may have no information about the
potential loss to Upwind Developer if Upwind Developer loses its
competing Wind Rights. In such a scenario, one might advocate for a
modified Levmore Rule Five approach, which would give Downwind
Developer the right to acquire Upwind Developer’s competing Wind Rights
for a royalty fee based on Downwind Developer’s expected profit.
Perhaps more intriguing is a hybrid of Rule Four and Levmore’s Rule
Five, similar to what Krier and Schwab called the “Double Reverse
Twist”—a rule regime wherein Rule Four applies if Upwind Developer
files its turbine site permit first, and the modified Rule Five applies if
Downwind Developer files first—and is thus deemed the best chooser.109
Unfortunately, a Double Reverse Twist Rule would have greater
susceptibility to strategic behavior problems than a simple Rule Four. If
Upwind Developer believed that a court or county hearing board would
place a higher valuation on Downwind Developer’s loss of Site D than
on Upwind Developer’s loss of Site U, Upwind Developer might delay

108. See Jimenez et al., supra note 2, for an example of the complexity of such
estimations.
109. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 30, at 471–73.
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filing its permit until Downwind Developer had done so—so that
Levmore’s Rule Five would apply. Conversely, Upwind Developer might
more hastily file its permit in situations where it believed that Rule Four
would be more favorable. Downwind Developer would have a corresponding
set of perverse incentives under the Double Reverse Twist Rule. The
parties’ ability to manipulate which rule would apply might also reduce
the likelihood of voluntary bargaining. For these reasons, using only
Rule Four seems a more promising approach.
IV. APPLYING RULE FOUR: WAIVABLE WAKE SETBACKS UNDER THE
SITE PERMITTING PROCESS
As a practical matter, how might a state or local government implement
Rule Four to allocate Wind Rights? A law that authorizes governments
to force upwind landowners to grant easements to their downwind
neighbors for private wind energy development risks violating the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.110 One means of reducing
constitutionality risks when implementing Rule Four would be to impose
ex ante wake setback requirements that are waivable upon satisfaction of
certain requirements in the turbine site permitting process.
Suppose that the county where Parcels U and D (in Figure F above)
are situated were to amend its zoning ordinance to impose “waivable”
downwind wake setback requirements on all properties zoned for
commercial wind energy development.111 The setbacks would prohibit
installation of wind turbines in any area where there is a reasonable
likelihood that turbine wake effects would extend onto downwind
property.112 When Upwind Developer113 filed its permit application to

110. For a detailed discussion of constitutional issues associated with the use of
eminent domain power for private economic development, see generally Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Although the Kelo Court held that such takings
under certain circumstances were constitutional, numerous state legislatures have
enacted legislation reacting to Kelo that restricts such use of the power of eminent
domain. The websites of some political organizations attempt to keep track of such
legislation. See, e.g., Castle Coalition, Eminent Domain Legislation Status Since Kelo,
July 9, 2007, http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/legislation/US_States_ED_Legis_Map_2007.pdf.
111. As already mentioned, such setbacks, without the waiver feature described in
this Article, have previously been enacted in some jurisdictions. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
112. If a five-rotor-diameter rule were applied, the wake setback would apply to the
cross-hatched areas depicted in Figure D above.
113. For simplicity, this illustration avoids drawing a distinction between Upwind
Developer—who may hold only a leasehold interest in Parcel U—and the owner of
Parcel U. In many cases, the notices described in this illustration may be delivered to fee
owners instead of or in addition to delivery of notice to developers. Fee owners often
must sign certain documentation or otherwise participate in the permitting process, and
provisions in many wind energy leases require cooperation with developers in such matters.
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install a turbine at Site U1, assuming that Site U1 is located within the
waivable wake setback area, notice of the application would be delivered
to Downwind Developer. The notice would give Downwind Developer
thirty days to deliver a bond and processing fee and file a form with the
county to request that the existing wake setback on Parcel U be made
nonwaivable and permanent (a Permanent Wake Setback). If Downwind
Developer failed to timely take these steps, the county would waive the
existing wake setback restriction on Parcel U, and Upwind Developer
would be free to install turbines at Site U1 and any other site within the
waived setback area—upon satisfaction of any other permit requirements.
A. Determining Upwind Developer’s Economic Loss
If Downwind Developer did timely file the Permanent Wake Setback
request form, Upwind Developer would be required, within a specified
time period, to provide to the county an estimate of its economic loss if
it were unable to install turbines within the wake setback area. Upwind
Developer would need to produce documentation—for example, relevant
portions of wind study reports for Parcel U and information about
current market pricing for wholesale wind-generated power—supporting
its estimate.114 The county would review Upwind Developer’s submitted
materials and determine the amount of fair compensation Downwind
Developer must pay to Upwind Developer to make the existing wake
setback permanent (the Setback Price). The Setback Price would include
estimated costs and attorney fees incurred by Upwind Developer in
connection with Downwind Developer’s request. To prevent delay tactics
by downwind property owners, only upwind landowners would be able
to appeal the county’s decision.

114. At least one commentator has noted the possibility of excessive investment by
the entitled party in an application of Rule Four. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601,
624 (2001) (arguing that a rule similar to Rule Four creates an additional scenario in
which an entitled party might capture value from its ex ante investment—that is, a
buyout by the non-entitled party—and that this additional possibility of value leads to
excessive investment). If Upwind Developer expected Downwind Developer to request
a permanent wake setback, it might have an incentive to overinvest on the basis that it
can include such investment when submitting its potential loss estimate to the county.
To mitigate this risk, an ordinance seeking to enact Rule Four would need to provide
clear guidelines on the types of expenses that are includable in an upwind owner’s cost
estimation.

243

RULE.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:16:24 AM

Assuming that the county’s determination of the Setback Price was
accurate and that Downwind Developer was rational, Downwind
Developer would pay such amount only if the wake-vulnerable areas on
Parcel D had more wind energy production potential than the Parcel U
areas subject to the waivable setback. If Downwind Developer elected
to pay the Setback Price and no appeal ensued, a “Notice of Permanent
Wake Setback” would be recorded against Parcel U and would thereby
provide public notice that the wake setback on Parcel U was permanent
and no longer subject to waiver. The amount of Downwind Developer’s
bond would be transferred to Upwind Developer and credited against
Downwind Developer’s amount due.
If Downwind Developer declined to pay the Setback Price, the wake
setback on Parcel U would be permanently waived. A “Notice of Waiver
of Upwind Wake Setback” would be recorded against Parcel D and
would give constructive notice to the public that Parcel U was not
subject to a wake setback. Such waiver would be subject to expiration
by abandonment if no commercial wind turbine were operated within the
former setback area for five consecutive years. The amount of Upwind
Developer’s reasonable costs or professional fees incurred throughout
the application process would be paid out of Downwind Developer’s
bond (to prevent frivolous requests for Permanent Wake Setbacks), and
any balance would be remitted to Downwind Developer. After the
process, the parties would still be free to voluntarily negotiate and could
still record a turbine wake easement against Parcel U in the event that
they eventually agreed to an arrangement whereby Downwind Developer
purchased the competing Wind Rights.
B. If Downwind Developer Is First to File a Permit Application
Thus far, we have assumed that Upwind Developer was the first to file
its turbine site permit application. What would the rule be if Downwind
Developer were to file its permit for one or more turbines on Parcel D
before Upwind Developer filed its Site U1 permit? In conjunction with
its permit filing, Downwind Developer would have the option to post a
bond, pay a processing fee, and request a Permanent Wake Setback for
Parcel U—just as already described. Upwind Developer would then be
notified of the application and asked to either provide wind study reports
and market value documentation to support its own loss estimate, permit
a mutually acceptable wind energy engineer to conduct wind studies on
the relevant portions of Parcel U—at Downwind Developer’s expense—
and submit results directly to the county, or accept a dollar amount
proposed by Downwind Developer.
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After a deadline for submitting all documentation, the county would
determine the Setback Price in the manner described above. As previously
described, if Downwind Developer chose to pay the Wake Setback Price, a
Notice of Permanent Wake Setback would be recorded against Parcel U.
If Downwind Developer declined to pay, a Notice of Waiver of Upwind
Wake Setback would be recorded against Parcel D. Regardless, Upwind
Developer and Downwind Developer would be permitted to keep copies
of the wind study reports prepared in connection with the easement
application. And regardless of the outcome, Downwind Developer would
pay Upwind Developer’s costs and attorney fees in the same manner as
previously described.
Again, Downwind Developer would be expected to file a request for a
Permanent Wake Setback only upon a belief that the net present value of
installing its turbines in wake-vulnerable areas of Parcel D exceeded the
net present value of Upwind Developer’s installation of turbines within
the wake setback area. The parties would still be free to voluntarily
negotiate around any outcome reached through the setback waiver process.
The process likely would not be employed in most cases but would be
available when one party’s irrationality prevents the voluntary bargain
needed for optimal turbine siting.
V. CONCLUSION
Rule Four of the Cathedral Model, despite being touted by its
discoverers as a potentially useful legal rule, has long been ignored in
practice. Surprisingly, Rule Four seems to fit the unique characteristics of
disputes between neighboring landowners over the siting of commercial wind
turbines. Conventional law supports protecting a landowner’s entitlement to
install turbines anywhere on its property, regardless of how turbine wake
effects might diminish the wind energy generation value of downwind
property. However, reliance on a property rule alone to protect the
entitlement leaves such conflicts vulnerable to failed bargaining and
suboptimal siting of wind turbines. Wind’s location-specific and fullyrenewable nature creates a strong public policy goal of promoting
turbine siting that will maximize productive efficiency, and Rule Four
seems to best promote this goal. Like most significant contributions
to legal academia, the Cathedral Model has undergone its share of criticism.
But new applications of the Model to emerging legal problems, including
this Article written thirty-six years after the Model was introduced,
reemphasize the Model’s great value to the field of law and economics.
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